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CoRPoRATIONS-OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS-VALIDITY OF VoTING AGREETO CoNTINUE SHAREHOLDERS AS DIRECTORs-Plaintiff, the president of
a corporation and owner of 31½ of the 100 shares of corporate stock outstanding, brought an action against A, the vice-president who owned 48½ shares,
and B, the owner of the remaining 20 shares, for specific performance of an
oral agreement between the plaintiff and A that the plaintiff and a third person,
X, should be continued as directors. The vice-president, A, had allied himself
with B, and in disregard of the agreement had served notice requesting a stockholders' meeting for the purpose of removing the plaintiff and X as directors.
Neither waste nor mismanagement by the plaintiff was proved by the defendants. Held, for the plaintiff. The oral agreement between the plaintiff and A
to continue the plaintiff and X as directors of the corporation is valid and may
be specifically enforced.1 Storer v. Ripley,. 125 N.Y.S. (2d) 831 (1953).2
There has been little harmony among the courts on the question of the
validity and enforceability of agreements entered into by shareholders to continue certain directors in office. The prevailing view of earlier cases was that
all voting agreements are void on the grounds that each shareholder has the
right to the unfettered judgment of every other shareholder in making the
corporate decisions, and that consequently it is against public policy to permit
the concomitant duty to exercise that judgment to be bargained away.3 With
a few notable exceptions,4 however, most jurisdictions in the last four decades
have repudiated this earlier view and today it can be said that voting agree-

MENTS

1 There is a real problem as to the applicability of the statute of frauds in the prin·
cipal case since the voting agreement was oral. See Dulin v. Pacific Wood and Coal Co.,
103 Cal. 357, 35 P. 1045 (1894).
2 Affd. on other grounds 282 App. Div. 950, 125 N.Y.S. (2d) 339 (1953).
3 Lothrop v. Goudeau, 142 La. 342, 76 S. 794 (1917); Haldeman v. Haldeman, 176
Ky. 635, 197 S.W. 376 (1917); Harris v. Scott, 67 N.H. 437, 32 A. 770 (1893). See
discussion in 71 A.L.R. 1287 (1931).
4 Roberts v. Whitson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) 188 S.W. (2d) 875; Cummins v.
McCoy, 22 Tenn. App. 681, 125 S.W. (2d) 509 (1938).
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ments, the purposes of which are not illegal, are not void per se.5 But where
such a contract is entered into for the purposes of exploiting the business of the
corporation to the prejudice of minority stockholders,6 attempting to supersede
the discretion of the directors,7 or for some other purpose forbidden by law,8
the agreement is invalid. But it is not objectionable that the shareholders'
motive in making the agreement is personal profit, or the perpetuation of themselves in office as directors, or even mere whim or caprice.9 The old view that
each stockholder was entitled to the individual judgment of each other stockholder is impossible of application in the highly complex corporation of today
with its many widely scattered stockholders. Furthermore, the many practical
purposes to which voting agreements may be put make their validity highly desirable.10 As a practical matter, gaining a majority vote without voting agreements is almost an impossibility in a large publicly owned corporation, while in
a close corporation independent voting in reality is a fiction.11 Consequently,
insofar as the principal case merely upholds the validity of the voting agreement
in question, the decision furnishes little possibility of attack on the grounds
of either current authority or wise public policy. To the extent that it specifically enforces the voting agreement, however, the principal case is without
the support of most authority.12 Although the agreement is not void, specific
5 Trefethen v. Amazeen, 93 N.H. llO, 36 A. (2d) 266 (1944); White v. Snell, 35
Utah 434, 100 P. 927 (1909). That hostility toward such agreements seems to be
lessening, see 5 FL1lTCHER, CYc. Coru>., perm ed., 256 (1952).'
6Weber v. Della Mt. Min. Co., 14 Idaho 404, 94 P. 441 (1908); People v. Burke,
72 Colo. 486, 212 P. 837 (1923); Venner v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 258 ill. 523, 101
N.E. 949 (1913). Also see ll ST. JoHNs L. REv. 117-118 (1936) for what the writer
calls a "damage test." Voting agreements are valid insofar as no one is to be damaged
thereby.
7 Creed v. Copps, 103 Vt. 164, 152 A. 369 (1930); Borland v. John F. Sass Printing
Co., 95 Colo. 53, 32 P. (2d) 827 (1934); Snow v. Church, 13 App. Div. 108, 42 N.Y.S.
1072 (1897). In many cases cited for the earlier view that voting agreements are void,
the courts may well have been influenced by what they felt was an attempt to control
the directors. However, in those states which pennit or direct the election of officers by
shareholders, voting agreements to elect officers would presumably be valid.
s Perhaps the alleged public policy against voting agreements may be traced to the
1890's when stock pooling agreements were among the legal forms devised to evade the
antitrust laws. Cf. West v. Camden, 135 U.S. 507, IO S.Ct. 838 (1890). That a consideration personal to the shareholder so agreeing will invalidate the agreement see 5 FLETCHER,
CYc. CoRP., perm. ed., 287, n. 51 (1952).
9 Davis v. Arguls Gas and Oil Sales Co., 167 Misc. 377, 3 N.Y.S. (2d) 241 (1938);
Brightman v. Bates, 175 Mass. 105, 55 N.E. 809 (1900).
10 For a discussion of the numerous beneficial purposes of voting agreements, see 3
Umv. Cm. L. REv. q40 (1936).
11 Some writers have advocated the division of corporation law ~to two parts, one
dealing with the large publicly owned corporation, and the other with close corporations.
Insofar as this proposal affects voting agreements, see the arguments in favor in Weiner,
"Legislative Recognition of Close Corporation," 27 MicH. L. REv. 273 (1928), and
against in 44 YALE L. J; 873 (1935).
12 Most of the cases involve attacks on the validity of the agreements rather than
suits for their enforcement. But existing authority indicates that specific enforcement will
usually be denied. Kennedy v. Monarch Mfg. Co., 123 Iowa 344, 98 N. W. 796 (1904);
3 CooK, CORPORATIONS, 8th ed., 2191 (1923); 5 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., perm. ed.,
290 (1952); 71 A.L.R. 1287 (1931).
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performance of such a contract has been denied by courts of equity on the
grounds that it is unwise to require the continuance of joint control of two
persons whose views are utterly irreconcilable,13 that it is against public policy
not to allow an obligor to withdraw from such an arrangement,14 and that
decrees of specific performance would be impossible of enforcement or would
lead to the control of many corporations by the courts themselves. However
valid these equitable doctrines may be in rationalizing the refusal to decree
specific performance, some courts, perhaps even enough to indicate a trend, have
disagreed with the practical results of such a disallowance.15 Since in most
cases of suit on the contract the law action is inadequate because damages are
too speculative,16 the result of the refusal to decree specific performance is to
create a right without a remedy. Assuming the validity of voting agreements,
the decree of specific performance is the only feasible means of enforcing them,
and the advantages of enforcement would seem heavily to outweigh the difficulties of enforcing the decree.1 7

John F. Dodge

1s Gage v. Fisher, 5 N.D. 297, 65 N.W. 809 (1895); Gleason v. Earles, 78 Wash.
491, 139 P. 213 (1914); Haldeman v. Haldeman, note l supra.
14 Moses v. Scott, 84 Ala. 608, 4 S. 742 (1888).
15 lliinois courts generally extend such relief. Thompson v. J. D. Thompson Carnation Co., 279 ID. 54, 116 N.E. 648 (1917). McQuade v. Stoneham, 142 Misc. 842,
256 N.Y.S. 431 (1932), allowed specific performance, but the case was later reversed on
the invalidity of the agreement. Also see Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641
(1936) (dictum); Application of Kirshner, 81 N.Y.S. (2d) 435 (1948). In White v.
Snell, note 5 supra, at 438, the court said: "As between the parties .•• we can conceive
of no good reason, either in law or equity, why such an agreement is not binding and
enforceable." Specific performance was allowed in Ringling Bros.-Bamum and Bailey
Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A. (2d) 441 (1947). In Smith
v. San Francisco & N.P.R. Co., 115 Cal. 584, 47 P. 582 (1897), and Davis v. Arguls
Gas and Oil Sales Co., note 9 supra, the decrees of the two courts had the same practical
result as a decree of specific performance.
•
16 3 Coox, CORPORATIONS, 8th ed., 2191 (1923).
11 47 MicH, L. B.Ev. 580 (1949).

